















　 Implicature can be defined as the difference between what the words in an utterance mean 
according to the rules of semantics and grammar, and what the speaker’s intended meaning is.
　 This paper looks at the theory of implicature and how H. P. Grice developed it. It sets out 
his cooperative principle and describes the four conversational maxims that he believed were 
necessary for efficient communication. It also looks at implicature triggers― the flouting of any 




of the four maxims― and their effects on meaning. In the final part of the paper I will set out a 
number of criticisms of Grice’s theory, and some of the alternatives that have been suggested.
The Cooperative Principle
　 Grice believed that when people communicated they acted rationally and followed a cooperative 
principle (CP).  He did not think that this CP was specific to communication, but that it applied to 
other cooperative activities, for example baking a cake, or mending a car (Grice, 1989).  Grice’s 
CP stated “[M]ake your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (1975: 
45).  Grice set out four conversational maxims that he asserted people generally follow when 
communicating efficiently (1975: 45―46)
　 “Quantity:
　 1.  Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange).
　 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
　 Quality:
　 Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
　 1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
　 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
　 Relation:
　 1. Be relevant.
　 Manner:
　 Supermaxim: Be perspicuous
　 1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
　 2. Avoid ambiguity.
　 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
　 4. Be orderly.”
　 Grice believed that speakers obeying the CP should be truthful, informative, relevant, and 
clear.  He did not claim that speakers are always cooperative; nor did he claim that speakers 
always follow the maxims.  Speakers may deliberately or accidentally violate one of the maxims for 
a number of effects, including lying―a covert violation of the maxim of quality (1), or metaphor
―an overt violation of the maxim of quality (1).
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　 Speakers may also flout a maxim when they are unable to conform to all of the maxims at once 
(Green, 1989).
　 Grice’s belief was that hearers assume that speakers are conforming to the CP, and interpret 
utterances under this assumption.  If a speaker’s utterance appears to fail to satisfy the CP, then 
the hearer will look for another interpretation, one that does satisfy the CP.  The difference 
between what the words in an utterance mean according to the rules of semantics and grammar, 
and what the speaker’s intending meaning was, Grice labeled implicature.
1. A: Did you get me any stamps?
B: The post office was closed.
　 In dialogue 1, B’s response to A’s question would seem to violate the maxim of relation. 
However, if A assumes that B is abiding by the CP, then A assumes that B’s response is relevant 
(as well as truthful, informative and clear), and will search for an interpretation of the response 
that follows these assumptions. A will interpret the sentence to mean that since the post office 
was closed, B was unable to buy any stamps for A. B has not explicitly stated whether or not she 
has bought stamps, but has implied (or implicated) that she has not.  The extra information is 
implicature― in this case conversational implicature.
　 Grice (1975) differentiated between conventional implicature and conversational implicature.
　 Conventional implicature is generated by the standard meaning of certain linguistic terms.  It is 
therefore “a semantic rather than pragmatic phenomenon” (Davis, 2005).
　 Grice provided the following example of conventional implicature:
2. “He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.” (Grice 1975: 44)
　 In this sentence, the meaning of therefore implicates causality.  The hearer does not need to 
assume that the CP is being followed in order to correctly interpret the utterance.
　 Conversational implicature on the other hand is not part of the conventional meaning of an 
utterance, and depends on the assumption that the speaker is following the maxims of the CP 
(for example, dialogue 1).  Grice (1975) set out a number of characteristics of conversational 
implicatures.  They should be:
・non-conventional
・calculable― i.e. the hearer can deduce the implicated meaning from the utterance, assuming 
that the conversation follows the CP.
・non-detachable― i.e. if the message was expressed in another way, the same implicature 
would apply.
・cancellable― i.e. the speaker can deny a particular meaning, for example in dialogue 1, 
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speaker B could add “but I bought some at the machine” to the utterance which would cancel 
the implicated meaning of “No, I didn’t”.
　 Grice (1989) provided a theoretical model for conversational implicature (S is the speaker, H is 
the hearer):
　 S conversationally implicates p if S implicates p when:
　 (i) S is presumed to be following the CP.
　 (ii) the supposition that S believes p is required to make S’s utterance consistent with the CP.
　 (iii)  S believes and expects H to believe that S believes, that H is able to determine that (ii) is 
true.
Implicature triggers
　 Green (1989) writes that the most common form of implicature derives from a flouting of the 
maxim of relation.  An utterance that, semantically and grammatically, may appear irrelevant such 
as in dialogue 1, can only be correctly interpreted if the hearer assumes that the speaker is in fact 
being relevant.  This results in a search for a relevant interpretation of the utterance.
3.
　 In (3), Dilbert’s colleague responds to Dilbert’s request for information with an apparently 
irrelevant comment.  His response does not seem to satisfy all of the maxims of the CP.  However, 
if we assume that he is following the CP we can infer that he actually means that he has ordered 
the plastic casings, but they have yet to arrive.  His response implicates “yes”.  In fact this is not 
the interpretation that Dilbert makes.  He assumes that his colleague is deliberately using the 
ambiguity of his response to avoid answering the initial question, and that the true response is in 
fact “no”.
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4.  Asked if he would make a special effort to help Mr. Blair in return for his support over 
Iraq, Mr. Bush replied: “I really don’t view our relationship as one of quid pro quo.”
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/g8/story/0,13365,1520827,00.html)
　 In (4) an extract from the Guardian Unlimited website, Mr. Bush’s response to the question 
appears to be irrelevant.  However, if we assume he is adhering to the CP, then we can infer that 
his response conversationally implicates “no, probably not”.  Politicians (amongst others) often 
use implicature as it allows them to avoid directly answering a question and it is cancellable, i.e. 
they can deny a particular interpretation of it.
　 Relation is not the only maxim that can be flouted.  In (3) Dilbert’s colleague also flouts the 
maxim of quantity (1) since Dilbert has asked for information and he has not provided it.  Green 
(1989) cites another example of the maxim of quantity (1) being flouted― in response to a request 
for a letter of recommendation about a student, A writes
5. Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and he always attended class regularly.
　 The recipient has to work out why the writer has not conformed to all of the maxims of CP. 
“This generally induces a metalinguistic comment about the discourse” (Green, 1989: 98).  The 
reader of A’s recommendation knows that A is able to conform to the four maxims should he or 
she choose to.  That A hasn’t, will lead the recipient to try to interpret the recommendation in 
a different way.  Green suggests that the metalinguistic comment is “What I am not saying is 
significant” (1989: 99), and that the reader interprets the recommendation as being negative. 
Conformity to the maxim of manner may have prevented A from writing an explicitly negative 
comment, since it is not considered good form to write this type of letter.
　 An overt violation of the maxim of quality can trigger implicature as in the case of sarcasm or 
metaphor.
6. Nice shot! (said to someone who has just missed an easy putt)
7. He was a rock in defence.
　 In (6) and (7) the speaker blatantly flouts the maxim of quality (1).  In (6) the speaker does not 
really believe it was a good shot, and in (7) the speaker does not really think that the defender was 
a rock.  This blatant violation of the CP triggers the search for the true and intended meaning. 
The implicature may result in the following interpretations:
8. Terrible shot!
9. He was like a rock in defence.
　 Green (1989) says that implicature can also be triggered by blatant violations of the maxim of 
quantity (1), implicating that the speaker is “unwilling to say more” (Grice (1989: 99)).
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　 Last week, while chatting on MSNMessenger a friend told me that he wouldn’t be able to play 
football at the weekend:
10. Pete: I’m not gonna make it on Saturday.
Rory: How come?
Pete: I’m on antibiotics.
Rory: What for?
Pete: I’m sick.
　 Pete must have known that I would assume he was sick, as he had already told me he was on 
antibiotics.  He must have known that I was seeking further information.  If we assume that Pete 
was being cooperative, then the fact that he did not provide me with further information implicates 
that he wanted me to infer that the information I sought was none of my business, or that he was 
not willing to provide this information for whatever reason.
　 A blatant violation of the maxim of manner also provides an implicature that is a “metalinguistic 
comment about the discourse in progress” Green (1989: 99).
　 In the following joke (11), remembered from my childhood, a young boy’s father violates the 
maxim of manner (“Be perspicuous”) in order to prevent his son from understanding what is being 
said.
11. Father (to wife):  I found a C-O-N-D-O-M on the P-A-T-I-O.
　 Unfortunately the ploy backfires as the son interrupts, saying
12. Son (to father): What’s a patio?
Problems
Universality of the Maxims
　 There are a number of problems with theories on implicature that critics have raised.  Keenan 
(1976) claimed that the cooperative principle and the maxims are not universal.  She studied 
Malagasy speakers and noted that they often appeared to flout the maxim of quantity (1).
13. A: Where is your mother?
B: She is either in the house or at the market.
　 In (13), speaker B is able to give a more precise answer but chooses to withhold some 
information.  Keenan claimed that this happened often and showed that Malagasy speakers must 
lack the maxim of quantity (1).  However, as Prince (1982) notes, just because a maxim is flouted, 
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this does not mean that it does not exist.  Furthermore, it is the flouting of maxims that actually 
gives rise to implicature.  Prince claims that as long as it can be shown that when the maxim of 
quantity (1) is flouted Malagasy speakers draw inferences from it, then the maxim is present.
　 In (13) speaker B withholds a certain amount of information from speaker A.  If the maxim of 
quantity (1) exists then what is the implicature of the utterance?  What should speaker A infer 
from the response.  Prince (1982) cites Keenan’s own data to show that information is highly 
prized in Malagasy society, especially ‘new’ information.  The possession of ‘new’ knowledge 
gives the holder a certain amount of prestige over those who do not have it.  Prince claims that “the 
inference drawn, is that B is, temporarily at least, superior in some way to A. If A had no Maxim 
of Quantity and were therefore unable to recognize the flouting of it, it is hard to see how B could 
accrue prestige in his eyes from such an exchange. Thus it seems that, in this case too, Malagasy 
speakers indeed have a Maxim of Quantity and use it to derive understandings that cannot be 
logically deduced” (1982: 5).
Differentiation
　 Davis (2005) uses the example of scalar implicature to show that Gricean theory can 
overgenerate implicatures.  He claims that “[T]he schema used to “work out” observed 
implicatures can usually be used just as well to work out nonexistent implicatures” (part 4).
14. Some athletes smoke
15. No athletes smoke
16. All athletes smoke
17. Less than 5% of athletes smoke
　 (14) is an example of scalar implicature since weaker and stronger statements can be formed 
by substituting other words or expressions for some as in (15―17).  In this example a weaker form 
is used to implicate that a stronger form is false.
　 According to Gricean theory the implicature is one of quantity (1).  Since the speaker’s 
contribution is as informative as is required, then if the speaker were able to state (15), he would 
have chosen to do so.  The fact that he did not must lead us to infer that sentence (15) is not true. 
Davis notes that the importance of this case is that the implicature is derived from what is not 
said.  Since the implication of (14) is that the stronger statement (16) is not true, Davis argues that 
other statements could also be implicated to not be true.  He lists a number of these, including:
18. “Some athletes smoke regularly
19. Some athletes smoke Marlboros
― 32 ―
愛知大学　言語と文化　No. 22
20. Some athletes and maids smoke” (Part 4)
　 The problem is how to differentiate between these different implicatures.
　 Other differentiation problems arise with sentences such as
21. John cut someone
22. John broke an arm
　 Sentence (21) implicates “John did not cut himself”.  Using the same argument as for sentence 
(14), Gricean logic would claim that the speaker would be flouting the maxim of quantity (1) if she 
were to state (21) knowing that John had cut himself.   However sentence (22) does not implicate 
“John did not break his own arm”, in fact it implicates that John did break his own arm.
　 A further differentiation problem that has yet to be addressed is the role played by stress (Davis, 
2005).
23. McCartney wrote some wonderful tunes
　 Sentence (23) if unstressed would be unlikely to generate any implicature (depending on 
the context).  However, if the word some were stressed, the implicature would be that not all 
of McCartney’s tunes were wonderful.  If the word tunes were stressed, it might implicate that 
though he wrote wonderful tunes, his lyric writing was not up to much.
Relevance
　 Sperber & Wilson (1986) produced one of the most influential alternatives to Grice’s theory. 
They developed a theory of relevance based on a number of assumptions about communication:
　 1.  Every utterance has a variety of linguistically possible interpretations, all compatible with 
the decoded sentence meaning.
　 2.  Not all these interpretations are equally accessible to the hearer (i.e. equally likely to come 
to the hearer’s mind) on a given occasion.
　 3.  Hearers are equipped with a single, very general criterion for evaluating interpretations 
as they occur to them, and accepting or rejecting them as hypotheses about the speaker’s 
meaning.
　 4.  This criterion is powerful enough to exclude all but at most a single interpretation (or a 
few closely similar interpretations), so that the hearer is entitled to assume that the first 
hypothesis that satisfies it (if any) is the only plausible one (Sperber & Wilson, 1986).
　 Sperber and Wilson argued that all of Grice’s maxims could be replaced by a single principle of 
relevance― that the speaker tries to be as relevant as possible in the circumstances (1986).
　 Davis (2005) argues that Sperber and Wilson’s theory suffers from some of the same problems 
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as Grice’s, including:
・overgeneralization of implicatures
・a clash with the principle of style
・a clash with the principle of politeness
Conclusion
　 Grice provided an alternative to code-based interpretation of utterances.  His cooperative 
principle allowed an inferential-based system of utterance-interpretation to develop.  It is clear 
that the message people intend to convey is not wholly contained within the words they use, but 
depends on hearers interpreting the message taking into account context and implicated meaning.
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